Red-Handed Without a Defense: Avoiding Civil Forfeiture When Leasing to Lawful Marijuana Tenants by unknown
Texas A&M Journal of Property 
Law 
Volume 3 
Number 2 2016 Student Articles Edition Article 1 
2016 
Red-Handed Without a Defense: Avoiding Civil Forfeiture When 
Leasing to Lawful Marijuana Tenants 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/journal-of-property-law 
 Part of the Property Law and Real Estate Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Red-Handed Without a Defense: Avoiding Civil Forfeiture When Leasing to Lawful Marijuana Tenants, 3 
Tex. A&M J. Prop. L. 91 (2018). 
Available at: https://doi.org/10.37419/JPL.V3.I2.1 
This Student Article is brought to you for free and open access by Texas A&M Law Scholarship. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Texas A&M Journal of Property Law by an authorized editor of Texas A&M Law 
Scholarship. For more information, please contact aretteen@law.tamu.edu. 
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWR\3-2\TWR207.txt unknown Seq: 1  3-JAN-17 14:35
RED-HANDED WITHOUT A DEFENSE:
AVOIDING CIVIL FORFEITURE WHEN LEASING
TO LAWFUL MARIJUANA TENANTS
Cielo Fortin-Camacho†
I. INTRODUCTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92 R
II. ORIGINS AND HISTORY OF CIVIL FORFEITURE . . . . . . . . . . 95 R
A. America’s Adoption of Guilty Property Forfeitures . . 96 R
B. Guilty Property Today . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97 R
III. MODERN CIVIL FORFEITURE STATUTES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97 R
A. Legislative History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98 R
1. Forfeiture of Real Property Under the
Comprehensive Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99 R
B. Civil Versus Criminal Forfeiture Proceedings . . . . . . . . 100 R
1. Civil Forfeiture Proceedings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102 R
IV. THE LEGAL HISTORY OF MARIJUANA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103 R
A. Smoke Signals from Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104 R
1. Leasing to Marijuana-Related Businesses Under
the Controlled Substances Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105 R
B. High Quantities of Marijuana-Related Businesses
Under the Obama Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106 R
1. Ogden Memo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106 R
2. Cole Memo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107 R
V. JUST BECAUSE YOU CAN DOES NOT MEAN YOU
SHOULD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108 R
A. Innocent Owners of Guilty Property . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109 R
B. Constitutional Defenses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109 R
C. Innocent-Owner Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112 R
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114 R
A. Compliance with Law Provision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114 R
B. Permitted Use Provision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115 R
C. Right to Inspect Provision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116 R
D. Indemnification Clause . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117 R
E. Early Termination Clause . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118 R
VII. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118 R
† This Article is dedicated to my father, Leon-Maurice Fortin, for showing me
that life’s not worth living if you don’t do it your way; to my mother, Maria Elena, for
always being so eager to have something to brag about; and to everyone who has ever
supported or taunted me in my endeavors. Grandescunt Aucta Labore.
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I. INTRODUCTION
California made history in 1996 when it became the first state to
legalize medical marijuana. Since then, twenty-three states and the na-
tion’s capital have legalized some form of medicinal marijuana1 while
Colorado,2 Washington,3 Alaska,4 Oregon,5 and the District of Co-
lumbia6 have gone a step further and legalized recreational use. As
the trend towards legalization continues, commercial property owners
interested in leasing to marijuana-related businesses are facing com-
plicated issues concerning the interplay between state and federal law.
In addition to the remote possibility of  arrest and prosecution by the
U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) for violation of the federal Con-
trolled Substances Act (“CSA”), landlords face the very real threat of
losing their property to civil asset forfeiture—even in states where
1. Federal prohibition on marijuana means each state that adopts medical mari-
juana provisions is free (forced) to create its own rules and regulations. Currently,
Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois,
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington have legalized some form of medicinal mari-
juana. As a result, medical marijuana programs across the country vary as to qualify-
ing health conditions, cultivation and possession limits, and even where and how the
marijuana is grown and consumed. See State Medical Marijuana Laws, NAT’L CONF.
OF ST. LEGISLATURES (June. 6, 2016), http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/state-medi-
cal-marijuana-laws.aspx; see also Gina Warren, Regulating Pot to Save the Polar Bear:
Energy and Climate Impacts of the Marijuana Industry, 40 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 385,
392–94 (2015) (analyzing the trend to legalize marijuana in the United States and the
varying rules and regulations among medical marijuana states).
2. See COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16, amended by COLO. CONST. amend. 64
(amendment 65 passed on November 6, 2012, and declared the use of marijuana be
taxed and regulated in a manner similar to alcohol, legal for persons twenty-one years
of age or older).
3. Initiative 502 (“I-502”) passed by popular vote in Washington State November
of 2012. I-502 authorizes the Washington State Liquor Control Board to regulate and
tax recreational marijuana products. See Act of July 8, 2014, ch. 3, 2013 Sess. Laws
Wash.
4. See ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 17.38.010 (West 2015) (Alaskan voters passed Pro-
position 2 on November 4, 2014, directing the Alcoholic Beverage Control Board to
adopt regulations and regulate the marijuana industry).
5. On November 4, 2014, fifty-six percent of voters approved Oregon Ballot
Measure 91 to legalize, regulate, and tax marijuana. See Oregon Legalized Marijuana
Initiative, Measure 91 (2014), BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Oregon_Legal
ized_Marijuana_Initiative,_Measure_91_(2014) (last visited Aug. 2, 2016). The initia-
tive’s purpose, among other things, was to “eliminate the problems caused by the
prohibition . . . of marijuana,” “establish a comprehensive regulatory framework con-
cerning marijuana under existing state law,” and to “permit persons licensed, con-
trolled, regulated, and taxed by [Oregon] to legally manufacture and sell marijuana to
persons 21 years of age and older.” See Control, Regulation, and Taxation of Mari-
juana and Industrial Hemp Act, ch. 1, 2015 Or. Laws.
6. Ballot Initiative 71 passed by a margin of almost 65% on November 4, 2014.
Washington D.C. Marijuana Legalization, Initiative 71 (November 2014), BALLOT
PEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Washington_D.C._Marijuana_Legalization,_Initiative_
71_(November_2014) (last visited Aug. 2, 2016); see generally D.C. CODE § 48-904.01
(2015).
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production, distribution, and sale of marijuana is legal under state law.
In fact, the federal government’s jurisdiction over marijuana is so
strong, it is irrelevant whether the property owner7 took part in, or
had knowledge of, the marijuana-related activity. As a result, the loss
to property owners has been alarming—reaching $4.5 billion in 2014
alone.8
The distribution and sale of marijuana is a federal crime;9 however,
in 2009, the United States Deputy Attorney General issued a guidance
memorandum that led many to believe otherwise. The Memo, dis-
cussed in Part IV of this Article, stated that federal enforcement of
state-level and other otherwise legal production, distribution, and sale
of marijuana would become low priority.10 Many misread the Memo
as a green light to begin large-scale marijuana production, failing to
realize that state and local laws permitting marijuana activity would
not be a defense to federal prosecution. Indeed, property owners who
lease to marijuana-related businesses not only continue to be subject
to penalties under the CSA, but also run the risk of subjecting their
leased property—be it a retail storefront, industrial space, or arable
land—to civil forfeiture.
Lawful marijuana tenants (“LMT”), or tenants who lease property
for the purpose of operating a marijuana-related business in compli-
ance with the applicable marijuana provisions of their state, are de-
manding property and offering big bucks—leaving property owners in
a precarious situation. This Article discusses the problem faced by
7. A landlord is a person who owns real property and rents or leases it to an-
other. For the purposes of this Article landlord and property owner will be used inter-
changeably. See Barron’s Law Dictionary (6th ed. 2010).
8. See generally Christopher Ingraham, Law Enforcement Took More Stuff from
People Than Burglars did Last Year, WASH. POST (Nov. 23, 2015), https://www.wash-
ingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/11/23/cops-took-more-stuff-from-people-than-
burglars-did-last-year/ (discussing how $4.5 billion represents thirty-five percent of
the entire number of assets collected from 1989–2010 and more than the total amount
of goods stolen by criminals in 2014 burglary offenses).
9. Marijuana is classified as a Schedule I drug, which means that—according to
the CSA—marijuana has no medically accepted use and has a high potential for
abuse. The cultivation, distribution, or possession of any amount of marijuana for any
purpose other than bona fide, federally approved scientific research is considered a
criminal offense. See 21 U.S.C.A. § 812(c) (West 2012); see also 21 U.S.C.A § 841(b)
(West 2010); see also 21 U.S.C.A. § 844 (West 2010); see generally Lisa N. Sacco &
Kristin Finklea, State Marijuana Legalization Initiatives: Implications for Federal Law
Enforcement, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. (Dec. 4, 2014), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/
misc/R43164.pdf.
10. There are some aspects of marijuana enforcement that are still priorities.
These aspects, listed in the guidance memoranda, include preventing distribution to
minors, preventing revenue from marijuana sales going to criminal enterprises, and
preventing diversion of marijuana from states where it is legal under state law to
other states where it is not legal. See Memorandum from Deputy Attorney Gen.
David Ogden on Investigations and Prosecutions in States Authorizing the Medical
Use of Marijuana (Oct. 19, 2009), http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/medical-ma-
rijuana.pdf [hereinafter Ogden Memo]. These guidelines are just that—guidelines—
they neither have the force of law nor modify existing federal laws.
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property owners wishing to lease premises to growers, processors, and
sellers of marijuana in states that have adopted marijuana provisions
and established regulatory frameworks.11 In these states, marijuana
provisions do not alter the respective state’s landlord-tenant statutes,
despite the various property-related requirements marijuana busi-
nesses must adhere to for licensure to operate.12 Licensing require-
ments in states with regulatory frameworks in place have lured
marijuana-related businesses from the shadows, leaving property own-
ers unable to meet the requirements of any statutory or common law
defense to civil forfeiture.13 Part II of this Article discusses the history
of civil forfeiture, focusing on the origin of the guilty property model
and its introduction to America. Part III will introduce modern civil
forfeiture statutes, their legislative history, and rationalize the govern-
ment’s use of civil proceedings over criminal proceedings before ex-
plaining the forfeiture process. Part IV briefly narrates marijuana’s
long history of legality in the United States before discussing its con-
trolling federal statutes. Part V of this Article reveals the possible con-
sequences of leasing property to marijuana-related businesses; the
focus then turns to the unavailability of suitable defenses for real
property owners who lease to LMTs. Part VI briefly describes the in-
adequacies of boilerplate provisions currently in standard lease agree-
ments and suggests respective lease modifications property owners
should be prepared to discuss with counsel and negotiate with pro-
spective LMTs. Lastly, this Article concludes by reminding property
owners that despite marijuana prohibition’s significant progress over
the last few years, it could all be undone when the next president
takes office in 2017.
11. Although Washington D.C. has legalized recreational and medicinal mari-
juana, Congress has repeatedly blocked D.C. from moving to tax and regulation. See
generally, Warren, supra note 1 at 400–01 (discussing a $1-trillion bill passed by Con-
gress that precludes funds from being used to “enact or carry out any law, rule, or
regulation to legalize or otherwise reduce penalties” for a Schedule I substance such
as marijuana) (citing Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, Pub.
L. No. 113-235 § 809, 128 Stat. 2130, 2394 (2014)).
12. Most counties, municipalities, cities, and towns impose their own licensing
schemes separate from those of its respective state. Generally, a license to operate
involves meeting qualifications in the application process, and remaining in compli-
ance with fees, packaging and labeling restrictions, advertising restrictions, record-
keeping and security requirements, and reasonable restrictions on time, place,
manner, and number of marijuana-related businesses. See Todd Garvey & Brian T.
Yeh, State Legalization of Recreational Marijuana: Selected Legal Issues, CONG. RE-
SEARCH SERV. (Jan. 13, 2014), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43034.pdf.
13. See FAQs: Recreational Marijuana in Oregon, OR. LIQUOR CONTROL
COMM’N, http://www.oregon.gov/olcc/marijuana/documents/measure91_faq.pdf (last
visited Mar. 5, 2016) (clarifying that Oregon’s Measure 91 does not affect landlord-
tenant law); Bob Young, Mercer Island Landlord Tries to Ban Pot in Apartment
Building, SEATTLE TIMES (Jan. 12, 2013), http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/
mercer-island-landlord-tries-to-ban-pot-in-apartment-building/ (stating state law al-
lows property owners to ban smoking marijuana in their properties despite I-502).
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II. ORIGINS AND HISTORY OF CIVIL FORFEITURE
The concept of civil forfeiture goes as far back as the biblical laws of
Exodus and the pre-Judeo Christian concept that inanimate objects
could be found guilty of wrongdoing.14 Following the collapse of the
Roman Empire, societies throughout Europe continued to develop in-
stitutions to pursue forfeiture actions on behalf of affected communi-
ties.15 At its inception, forfeiture actions sought to destroy or remove
guilty property from the affected community and almost never served
as a substitute action against negligent or otherwise culpable owners.16
In ancient Greece and numerous societies throughout the world, pro-
ceedings against inanimate objects historically existed as a means to
rid the community of the moral taint attached to the guilty property.17
For certain societies, restoring a sense of moral equilibrium within the
wronged society required assigning guilt to the transgressing
property.18
Deodand, derived from the Latin phrase deo dandum meaning, “to
be given to God,” was the term used for forfeiture that resulted when
an animate or inanimate object owned by one individual directly or
indirectly caused the death of another.19 Because of the legal fiction
that an object capable of killing a king’s subject was capable of future
harm, the property was destroyed or forfeited to the king or local lord.
Later, deodand objects were no longer confiscated; instead, their
14. “If an ox gore a man or woman, and they die, he shall be stoned: and his flesh
shall not be eaten, but the owner of the ox shall be quit.” Exodus 21:28 (King James);
see also Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 681 (1974) (quot-
ing Exodus 21:28 to trace the historical origins of forfeiture); Steven L. Schwarcz &
Alan E. Rothman, Civil Forfeiture: A Higher Form Of Commercial Law?, 62 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 287, 289–90 (1993).
15. See Paul Schiff Berman, An Anthropological Approach to Modern Forfeiture
Law: The Symbolic Function of Legal Actions Against Objects, 11 YALE J.L. &
HUMAN. 1, 23 (2013).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 21–22.
18. Id. at 22. According to Plato, if the murderer could not be found, the object
used to commit the crime would serve as a proxy and banished from society:
[I]f any lifeless thing deprive a man of life, except in the case of a thunder-
bolt or other fatal dart sent from the gods—whether a man is killed by life-
less objects falling upon him, or his falling upon them, the nearest of kin
shall appoint the nearest neighbor to be a judge and thereby acquit himself
and the whole family of guilt. And he shall cast forth the guilty thing beyond
the border.
Id. at 22–23.
19. George Kurisky, Civil Forfeiture of Assets: A Final Solution to International
Drug Trafficking?, 10 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 239, 249–50 (1988) (briefly detailing the tradi-
tion and history of civil asset forfeiture in England and North America); see also
Schwarcz & Rothman, supra note 14 at 290.
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value was assessed and the amount was due to the Crown as
forfeiture.20
Under English common law, forfeiture was justified on the basis
that the property’s seizure benefitted the masses through charitable
means, although funds were seldom distributed among the poor.21 De-
spite this, property owners under the king’s jurisdiction were afforded
a certain amount of due process in forfeiture proceedings.22 Specifi-
cally, a twelve-person jury actively investigated and resolved all deo-
dand proceedings, including determining the object or property
subject to action. Originally, only guilty property was subjected to civil
forfeiture. If the wheel of a mill dragged a person to their death, the
wheel alone would be forfeited, not the entire mill. Similarly, if a por-
tion of a mine collapsed, killing the person beneath, “the weight of
earth is forfeit, not the whole mine.”23 Over time, however, English
kings expanded deodand proceedings “to include all property and
chattels belonging to criminals, serving, in principle, as a type of
fine.”24
A. America’s Adoption of Guilty Property Forfeitures
Although largely disfavored and infrequently used,25 forfeitures
based on notions of guilty property were occurring in every colony
across America by the seventeenth century.26 In due time, however,
forfeiture laws began to see extensive use.27 In early colonial admi-
ralty courts, ships were treated as live beings, and proceedings were
initiated against vessels by name. This occurred, perhaps, because
“only by supposing the ship to have been treated as if endowed with
personality, [can] the arbitrary seeming peculiarities of the maritime
law [ ] be made intelligible.”28 During the Civil War, civil forfeiture
20. See Finkelstein, The Goring Ox: Some Historical Perspectives on Deodands,
Forfeitures, Wrongful Death and the Western Notion of Sovereignty, 46 TEMP. L.Q.
169, 185 (1973).
21. Id. at 182.
22. See generally MATTHEW HALE ET AL., THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE
CROWN: IN TWO VOLUMES, Vol. 1, 422–23 (London, Sollom Emlyn, Lincoln’s-Inn
1800).
23. See id.
24. Schwarcz & Rothman, supra note 14 at 290 (citing Calero-Toledo v. Pearson
Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 680–81 (1974)).
25. “Forfeitures were largely disfavored, primarily because the government’s
seizure of private property was a leading source of tension between the former colo-
nists and the British Crown. In fact, the United States Constitution protects property
not only through the Due Process Clause, but also through a specific limitation on the
on the scope of forfeiture in the treason context.” Id. at 291.
26. See generally Cyrus H. Karraker, Deodands in Colonial Virginia and Mary-
land, 37 AM. HIST. REV. 712, 713 (1932) (“Deodands occurred, it seems, in all the
colonies.”).
27. Schwarcz & Rothman, supra note 14 at 291.
28. See generally OLIVER W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 26–27 (Little,
Brown, 1909).
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legislation made way for the confiscation of property belonging to
rebels and Southern sympathizers. The Supreme Court repeatedly up-
held these types of forfeiture actions.29
B. Guilty Property Today
Modern forfeiture statutes, like those before it, are based on the
fictional notion of “guilty property” which finds that property,
through illegal activity or use, has become corrupt.30 Because the
property, and not the property owner, is party to the action, the prop-
erty owner’s guilt or innocence is irrelevant.31 The prosecution of in-
animate objects, such as real property, has been justified as a form of
punishment for negligent owners; however, proceedings typically refer
to the guilty property as the guilty party and have yet to adopt a nar-
rative invoking negligence principles.32 The legal fiction that civil for-
feiture punishes only the property and not its owner has been used to
justify courts’ failure to apply the protections generally attached to
criminal proceedings.33 Pervasive use of civil forfeiture has also been
justified by the same rationale offered by the government during the
Civil War: “since the enemy threatens the very fabric of the nation,
the strongest measures are required.”34
III. MODERN CIVIL FORFEITURE STATUTES
Commercial buildings, storefronts, and other real property may be
seized by the Attorney General and forfeited to the United States any
time the government has probable cause to believe that the real prop-
erty is being used “to commit, or to facilitate the commission of” a
felony violation. Section 511(a)(7) of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse
Prevention and Control Act (“Comprehensive Act”) presents a seri-
ous threat to property owners seeking to lease to LMTs by providing
for forfeiture of real and personal property related to CSA violations
that have not been criminally prosecuted.
Pursuant to 18 U.S.C §881(a)(7):
29. Schwarcz & Rothman, supra note 14 at 291.
30. United States v. U.S. Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 719–20 (1971) (finding
that modern forfeiture statutes are the direct descendants of traditional forfeiture ac-
tions that proceeded upon the fiction inanimate objects themselves could be guilty of
wrongdoing).
31. Id.
32. Berman, supra note 15, at 29–30; see also 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMEN-
TARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND IN FOUR BOOKS *301 (George Sharswood ed.,
1893) (“[Some deodands are] grounded upon this additional reason, that such misfor-
tunes are in part owing to the negligence of the owner, and therefore he is properly
punished for such forfeiture.”).
33. George C. Pratt & William B. Peterson, Civil Forfeiture in the Second Circuit,
65 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 653, 654 (1991) (noting that the doctrine of civil forfeiture has
survived because of its ability to “efficiently and quietly serve[ ] an important inter-
est—the swift punishment of unacceptable conduct”).
34. Id. at 664.
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWR\3-2\TWR207.txt unknown Seq: 8  3-JAN-17 14:35
98 TEXAS A&M J. OF PROP. L. [Vol. 3
The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the United States and
no property right shall exist in them . . . [a]ll real property, including
any right, title, and interest (including any leasehold interest) in the
whole of any lot or tract of land and any appurtenances or improve-
ments, which is used, or intended to be used, in any manner or part,
to commit, or to facilitate the commission of, a violation of this sub-
chapter punishable by more than one year’s imprisonment.
A. Legislative History
In 1970, following a century of little use, civil forfeiture gained re-
newed acceptance as a powerful weapon in the War on Drugs.35 That
year the Ninety-first Congress, expressing a desire to punish and deter
drug dealers through forfeiture proceedings,36 enacted the Compre-
hensive Act, which included the country’s first criminal forfeiture stat-
ute. Congress promised the legislation would serve as a “mighty
deterrent to any further expansion of organized crime’s economic
power”37 and a blow “to the growing menace of drug abuse.”38 As
enacted, the Comprehensive Act provided for the forfeiture of real
property “affording a source of influence over” a “continuing criminal
enterprise.”39 However, by 1978 Congress determined that its goal of
curbing the predatory business practices of drug traffickers was not
being met. Remarks on the Senate floor from Senator John Culver
noted that the provision’s original language reached the property of
individuals with no knowledge of the illegal transactions.40 In turn,
Congress sought to remedy this by expressly exempting from forfei-
ture the interests of persons who did not consent to, or have knowl-
edge of drug crimes occurring by way of their respective property.41 In
35. See Schwarcz & Rothman, supra note 14 at 292 (citing Pratt & Peterson, supra
note 33, at 664).
36. Scott Alexander Nelson, Comment, The Supreme Court Takes a Weapon
From the Drug War Arsenal: New Defenses to Civil Drug Forfeiture, 26 ST. MARY’S
L.J. 157, 168 (1994) (describing the origins and purpose of modern forfeiture
statutes).
37. Id.
38. Pratt & Peterson, supra note 33, at 664.
39. Until amended in 1984, the section regarding a “continuing criminal enter-
prise” read in relevant part:
(2) Any person who is convicted under paragraph (1) of engaging in a con-
tinuing criminal enterprise shall forfeit to the United States –
. . .
(B) any of his interest in, claim against, or property or contractual rights of
any kind affording a source of influence over, such enterprise.
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513,
§ 408(a)(2), 84 Stat. 1236, 1265–66.
40. 124 Cong. Rec. 23,056 (1978) (statement of Sen. Culver).
41. Section 301 of the Act amended 511(a)(codified at 21 U.S.C. 881(a)) of the
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 by adding the fol-
lowing section:
(6) All moneys, negotiable instruments, securities or other things of value
furnished or intended to be furnished by any person in exchange for a con-
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1984, Congress once again amended the Comprehensive Act to add a
provision enabling the seizure of real property—declaring that all
right and title to property vest in the United States “upon commission
of the act giving rise to forfeiture.”42
1. Forfeiture of Real Property Under the Comprehensive Act
Through civil forfeiture statutes, Congress has expanded the na-
tion’s war on drugs to every physical object involved in the narcotics
trade.43 In 1984, the Comprehensive Act expanded its scope to reach
real property, holding that:
(a) [t]he following shall be subject to forfeiture to the United States
and no property right shall exist in them:
. . .
(7) All real property, including any right, title, and interest (includ-
ing any leasehold  interest) in the whole of any lot or tract of land
and any appurtenances or improvements, which is used or intended
to be used in any manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate the
commission of, a violation of this subchapter punishable by more
than one year’s imprisonment. . .44
Despite language courts have called “at best, confusing,”45 the statute
holds that no real property may be forfeited if the claimant establishes
that the drug activity took place “without the knowledge or consent”
of the claimant. In other words, all marijuana-related businesses oper-
ating under the regulatory framework of their state are vulnerable to
trolled substance in violation of this title, all proceeds traceable to such an
exchange, and all moneys, negotiable instruments, and securities used or in-
tended to be used to facilitate any violation of this title, except that no prop-
erty shall be forfeited under this paragraph, to the extent of the interest of
an owner, by reason of any act or omission established by that owner to have
been committed or omitted without the knowledge or consent of that owner.
Psychotropic Substances Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-633, § 301(a)(1), 511(a)(6), 92
Stat. 3768, 3777 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (1988)).
42. 21 U.S.C. § 881(h) (West 2002).
43. Given that current practice under § 881(a)(7) appears to be far removed from
the legal fiction upon which the civil forfeiture doctrine is based, it may be neces-
sary—in an appropriate case—to reevaluate our generally deferential approach to
legislative judgments in this area of civil forfeiture. United States v. James Daniel
Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 82 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
44. § 881(a)(7).
45. See United States v. 141st St. Corp., 911 F.2d 870, 878 (2d Cir. 1990). Circuit
Judge Thomas Joseph Meskill, in determining that allowing a property owner to avoid
forfeiture by establishing a lack of consent will not undermine congressional intent,
noted that:
[c]ongress’ use of the disjunctive “or” suggests that a claimant should suc-
ceed by establishing either lack of knowledge or lack of consent. On the
other hand, inclusion of the word “without” before the phrase “knowledge
or consent” might be interpreted to mean that an innocent owner must be
without both knowledge and consent.
Id.
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forfeiture by virtue of their state-law abiding visibility. Often enough,
an internet search will identify the nature of the property’s use and
satisfy the probable cause necessary for the federal government to ini-
tiate forfeiture proceedings. Section 881(a)(7) of the Comprehensive
Act contains no limit as to how much of a property owner’s land or
dwelling can be subject to forfeiture. In fact, the federal government
once argued that all of Texas would be forfeited under a literal read-
ing of section 881(a)(7), if Texas were owned by one person that had
knowledge of or consented to a drug deal occurring on one acre of the
state.46
B. Civil Versus Criminal Forfeiture Proceedings
Every year, police and prosecutors across the country seize billions
of dollars of property through civil forfeiture proceedings, despite the
availability of criminal forfeiture statutes.47 In fact, civil forfeiture pro-
ceedings far outpace criminal ones—with 83% of all forfeitures be-
tween 1997 and 2013 proceeding as civil actions.48
Civil forfeiture procedures greatly favor the government for many
reasons. First, civil forfeiture is simply faster; the government need
not wait for a criminal prosecution to proceed to seize property or
initiate a civil forfeiture action. Second, the government’s likelihood
of success in a civil forfeiture is much greater. In a criminal forfeiture
proceeding, the government must prove each element of the underly-
ing offense beyond a reasonable doubt.49 By comparison, probable
cause in civil forfeiture actions merely requires the government
demonstrate “reasonable grounds, rising above the level of mere sus-
picion, to believe that certain property is subject to forfeiture.”50 In
other words, the government need not show prima facie proof or sat-
isfy evidence standards applicable to most civil suits.51 In fact, the
proof necessary to establish probable cause can traditionally be estab-
lished by hearsay.52 Lastly, criminal forfeiture proceedings are in per-
46. See United States v. Sixty Acres, 727 F. Supp. 1414, 1422 (N. D. Ala. Jan. 5,
1990), vacated on other grounds 736 F. Supp. 1579 (N.D. Ala. May 11, 1990).
47. See generally DICK CARPENTER ET AL., POLICING FOR PROFIT: THE ABUSE OF
CIVIL ASSET FORFEITURE 13 (Institute for Justice, 2d ed. 2015), http://ij.org/wp-con
tent/uploads/2015/11/policing-for-profit-2nd-edition.pdf.
48. See id.
49. Damon Garett Saltzburg, Real Property Forfeitures as a Weapon in the Gov-
ernment’s War on Drugs: A Failure to Protect Innocent Ownership Rights, 72 B.U. L.
Rev. 217, 224 (1992).
50. United States v. One Parcel of Property Located at 15 Black Ledge Drive, 897
F.2d 97, 101 (2d Cir. 1990).
51. As the court stated in United States v. One 56-Foot Motor Yacht Named
Tahuna, “[t]he determination of probable cause in a forfeiture proceeding simply in-
volves the question whether the information relied on by the government is adequate
and sufficiently reliable to warrant the belief by a reasonable person that the vessel
was used to transport controlled substances.” 702 F.2d 1276, 1281–82 (9th Cir. 1983).
52. See 19 U.S.C. § 1615 (2016).
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sonam and proceed as part of the criminal prosecution rather than as
a separate proceeding, and adjudicate the government’s title only as to
the named defendants.53 In civil asset forfeiture cases involving real
property, on the other hand, the government actually sues the prop-
erty itself and the property owner is treated as a third party
claimant.54
Property owners face other hurdles unique to civil asset forfeiture.
Specifically, the burden of proof in civil forfeitures is reversed because
once the federal government has shown probable cause, the burden of
proof shifts to the property owner.55 The property owner must then
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the property was not,
in fact, used or intended to be used in a proscribed manner, or that
operation of the marijuana related business occurred without the
property owner’s knowledge or consent.56 There is no requirement
that the property owner be prosecuted in relation to the marijuana
business operating on his or her property. Put simply: by virtue of the
forfeiture’s civil nature, the government can avoid providing property
owners with many other protections the Constitution typically affords
criminal defendants.57
There are also other, less obvious, reasons the federal government
opts for civil asset forfeiture. First, the constantly expanding public
approval of medical marijuana makes criminal charges appear as
though the federal government is targeting sick people.58 Second, the
threat of civil asset forfeiture alone is often sufficient for the federal
government to secure the closure of marijuana businesses.59 Accord-
ing to a U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of California, warning
letters threatening forfeiture action for failure to comply with federal
law typically result in “the landlord kicking out the offending enter-
53. Brad A. Chapman & Kenneth W. Pearson, Comment, The Drug War and Real
Estate Forfeiture Under 21 U.S.C. § 881: The “Innocent” Lienholder’s Rights, 21 TEX.
TECH. L. REV. 2127, 2129 (1990).
54. Id. at 2128–29.
55. Id. at 2152–53. Not only does the burden shift to the claimant opposing forfei-
ture, but the claimant’s burden is heavier than the government’s. While the govern-
ment, to establish a prima facie case for forfeiture, need only demonstrate
“reasonable grounds,” the owner of the seized property must prove that the defen-
dant property is legitimate ”by a preponderance of the evidence,” a more stringent
standard. Id.
56. Sandra Guerra, Family Values?: The Family as an Innocent Victim of Civil
Drug Asset Forfeiture, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 343, 370 (1996) (stating that property
owners “face the unenviable task of proving a negative: that they did not have knowl-
edge of or did not consent to the illegal use”).
57. Id. at 362–63.
58. “If you bring criminal charges against these medical marijuana businesses, the
federal government gets pilloried in the press for attacking California law and sick
people.” Brett Wolf, U.S. Targets Landlords in Fight Against Medical Pot, REUTERS
(June 14, 2012, 6:05 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-marijuana-landlords-
idUSBRE85D0JA20120614 (quoting Greg Baldwin, a partner at the Miami law firm
Holland & Knight and a former federal prosecutor).
59. Id.
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prise.”60 This method has proven to be incredibly effective because
few property owners have the resources to pay “hundreds of
thousands of dollars to defend against a government lawsuit to keep a
tenant, let alone risk losing their investments.”61 Moreover, property
owners must overcome the government’s upper hand without the right
to appointed counsel, and attorneys cannot accept civil forfeiture
cases on a contingent fee basis because winning only results in retain-
ing the property.62 Ultimately, civil forfeitures are just plain easier and
require less manpower. Federal agents can simply search the internet,
identify marijuana businesses, verify that they are operating, and serve
them with a warning letter.63
1. Civil Forfeiture Proceedings
The government begins forfeiture proceedings by filing a complaint
against the property in question, pursuant to the Supplemental Rules
for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims, and taking actual or con-
structive seizure of the property.64 As previously discussed, the initial
warrant for the property merely requires that the government’s com-
plaint allege specific facts supporting a reasonable belief that a given
property is subject to forfeiture.65 Although the specific facts relate to
violations of criminal law, the government’s burden is fractional to
that typically associated with criminal proceedings.66 Once the war-
rant is issued, the government has five years from the discovery of the
alleged offense to commence a forfeiture action.67
In proving its case, the government need only demonstrate a rea-
sonable belief that a connection exists between the commission of a
federal drug violation and the real property subject to forfeiture, and
may use certain types of evidence normally excluded in criminal pro-
ceedings.68 Specifically, hearsay and circumstantial evidence is admis-
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Guerra, supra note 57, at 364. Currently, North Carolina is the only state that
allows an attorney to charge a contingency fee for representation in a civil asset forfei-
ture proceeding, if not otherwise prohibited by law. See Variations of the ABA Model
Rules of Professional Conduct: Rule 1.5 Fees, ABA (Nov. 5, 2015), http://www.ameri
canbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/mrpc_1_5.auth
checkdam.pdf.
63. See Wolf, supra note 59.
64. 21 U.S.C. § 881(b) (West 2002).
65. United States v. $ 38,000 in United States Currency, 816 F.2d 1538, 1548 (11th
Cir. 1987) (holding that a § 881(a) forfeiture complaint must allege sufficient facts to
provide a reasonable belief that the property is subject to forfeiture).
66. See supra notes 47–48 and accompanying text.
67. The statute of limitations is determined under the customs laws as stated in
§ 881(d). The customs laws state that the government must initiate a forfeiture action
within five years of the date on which the offense was first discovered. 19 U.S.C.
§ 1621 (2016).
68. See United States v. Route 2, Box 61-C, 727 F. Supp. 1295, 1298 (W.D. Ark.
1990).
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sible to prove probable cause in a civil forfeiture proceeding.69 If the
government can show probable cause, the burden shifts to the prop-
erty owner to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the prop-
erty is not subject to forfeiture, or that a defense to forfeiture
applies.70 As such, if the property being leased is made available to
host a section 881(a)(7) violation, such as a marijuana-related busi-
ness, the property is forfeitable.
IV. THE LEGAL HISTORY OF MARIJUANA
For much of our nation’s history, the cultivation and sale of mari-
juana has been a common and lawful practice.71 The marijuana plant
is believed to have first made its American debut in 1545, when the
Spanish introduced it to the New World;72 however, it was not until
the English brought it to Jamestown in 1611 that marijuana became
one of the country’s most valuable cash crops for its use in hemp pro-
duction.73 Within decades, and until the early 1800s, marijuana was a
widely used form of legal tender.74 Even as cotton replaced hemp as
the leading textile fiber crop, the cultivation and sale of the plant re-
mained legal. In fact, the country’s first drug control law, the federal
Harrison Narcotic Act of 1914,75 did not address marijuana.76 By the
1920s, marijuana gained cultural acceptance among the jazz commu-
nity, and marijuana clubs—then known as ‘tea pads’—began operat-
ing in all major cities across the country.77
69. See United States v. 1964 Beechcraft Baron Aircraft, 691 F.2d 725, 728 (5th
Cir. 1982) (affirming hearsay as constituted sufficient evidence to make a finding of
probable cause in a 21 U.S.C. § 881 forfeiture proceeding); United States v. One 1974
Porsche 911-S Vehicle, 682 F.2d 283, 286 (1st Cir. 1982) (holding hearsay may contrib-
ute to probable cause for issuance of a search warrant, if there is substantial basis for
crediting the hearsay); see also United States v. Thirteen Thousand Dollars in United
States Currency, 733 F.2d 581, 584 (8th Cir. 1984) (holding the government carried its
burden of probable cause by providing circumstantial evidence the property owner
used a false name for the purpose of purchasing illegal drugs).
70. See Route 2, 727 F. Supp. at 1298.
71. MARK EDDY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33211, MEDICAL MARIJUANA: RE-
VIEW AND ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL AND STATE POLICIES 1 (2010), http://fas.org/sgp/
crs/misc/RL33211.pdf. (“For most of American history, growing and using marijuana
was legal under both federal law and the laws of the individual states.”).
72. Marijuana’s history dates back to 2737 B.C. when it was first described in the
writings of Chinese emperor Shen Nung, referencing the plant as a psychoactive
agent. See History of Marijuana, NARCONON, http://www.narconon.org/drug-infor-
mation/marijuana-history.html (last visited Feb. 29, 2016).
73. See K.K. DuVivier, State Ballot Initiatives in the Federal Preemption Equation:
A Medical Marijuana Case Study, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 221, 275 (2005).
74. Id.
75. Harrison Narcotic Act of 1914, 63 Pub. L. No. 223, 38 Stat. 785, 63 Cong. Ch. 1
(1914) (repealed by the Controlled Substances Act of 1970).
76. Instead, the Harrison Act of 1914, addressed the importation of opium for
medicinal purposes and the interstate trade of cocaine, morphine, and heroin. See id.
77. See Kasey C. Phillips, Drug War Madness: A Call for Consistency Amidst the
Conflict, 13 CHAP. L. REV. 645, 648–649 (2010).
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A. Smoke Signals from Congress
In the 1930s, however, the Federal Bureau of Narcotics began pav-
ing way for a campaign to prohibit marijuana.78 Enacted in 1932, the
Uniform Narcotic Drug Act (“UNDA”) had the dual purpose of im-
peding illegal drug trade and regulating the sale and distribution of
narcotics.79 Although the UNDA did not classify marijuana as a con-
trolled substance, it contained a footnote suggesting statutory lan-
guage for states wanting to regulate the plant.80 The federal
government got a step closer to prohibition in 1937, when it explicitly
began taking control of marijuana regulation for the first time. That
year, Congress passed the Marihuana Tax Act (“Tax Act”),81 which
did not expressly prohibit the possession or sale of marijuana, but
rather “imposed registration and reporting requirements for all indi-
viduals importing, producing, selling, or dealing in marijuana.”82
Finally, in 1970, the federal government solidified its control over
marijuana regulation with the passage of the Controlled Substances
Act (“CSA”) as Title II of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Preven-
tion and Control Act.83 The CSA replaced over fifty pieces of drug
legislation and established a single system of control for both narcotic
and psychotropic drugs—a first in American history.84 Moreover, and
78. The Federal Bureau of Narcotics is now known as the Bureau of Narcotics and
Dangerous Drugs. Prior to the creation of the DEA, drug enforcement rested in the
hands of two federal offices: The Bureau of Narcotics in the Treasury Department and
the Bureau of Drug Abuse Control (BDAC) in the Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare. See U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), ALLGOV, http://
www.allgov.com/departments/department-of-justice/us-drug-enforcement-administra-
tion-dea?agencyid=7195 (last visited Feb. 26, 2016). The Bureau of Narcotics was re-
sponsible for the control of marijuana and narcotics, while the BDAC was responsible
for the control of drugs, including depressants, stimulants, and hallucinogens. Id. By
1968, America’s recreational drug use was steadily rising and President Lyndon John-
son responded by introducing legislation that combined the Bureau of Narcotics and
the BDAC into one new agency—the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs
(BNDD), located in the Department of Justice. Id.
79. See People v. Van Alstyne, 121 Cal. Rptr. 363, 372 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975).
80. See id.; Specifically, the UNDA instructed states to include “cannabis” to its
state law’s definition of “narcotics.” Michael D. Moberly & Charitie L. Hartsig, The
Arizona Medical Marijuana Act: A Pot Hole for Employers?, 5 PHX. L. REV. 415, 423
(2012).
81. The Marihuana Tax Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-238, 50 Stat. 551 (1937) (re-
pealed 1970), was a United States Act that placed a tax on the sale of cannabis.
82. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 11 (2005); see also United States v. White
Plume, 447 F.3d 1067, 1071 (8th Cir. 2006) (describing how legitimate users of indus-
trial hemp were subject to a small tax ($1 per year), and by contrast, a prohibitively
high tax ($100 per transfer) applied to anyone who had not registered with the gov-
ernment to discourage illegal use).
83. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-
513, 84 Stat. 1236.
84. Thomas A. Duppong, Industrial Hemp: How the Classification of Industrial
Hemp as Marijuana Under the Controlled Substances Act has Caused the Dream of
Growing Industrial Hemp In North Dakota to Go Up In Smoke, 85 N.D. L. REV. 403,
416–417 (2009).
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of relevance to landlords in states that have legalized marijuana, the
CSA, unlike the Tax Act and UNDA, includes marijuana among its
classifications of controlled substances and makes it illegal “to manu-
facture, distribute, dispense, or possess” it.85 In fact, the CSA classifies
marijuana among the most harmful and dangerous drugs, along with
LSD and heroin.86 Accordingly, the manufacture, distribution, orpos-
session of marijuana is a criminal offense where simple possession is a
misdemeanor; and possession of larger amounts; possession with in-
tent to distribute; distribution; and cultivation of the plant are felonies
subject to severe penalties.87 Since cultivating, manufacturing, and dis-
tributing marijuana are federal crimes, real property used to facilitate
the commission of those acts is subject to asset forfeiture.
1. Leasing to Marijuana-Related Businesses Under
the Controlled Substances Act
The CSA provides that property owners that conspire or aid mari-
juana-related businesses by renting property to them are acting in vio-
lation of federal law. Specifically, section 856(a) of the CSA provides
that:
[I]t shall be unlawful to—
(1) knowingly open, lease, rent, use or maintain any place, whether
permanently or temporarily, for the purpose of manufacturing, dis-
tributing, or using any controlled substance;
(2) manage or control any place, whether permanently or tempora-
rily, either as an owner, lessee, agent, employee, occupant, or mort-
gagee, and knowingly and intentionally rent, lease, profit from or
make available for use, with or without compensation, the place for
85. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (West 2010).
86. See id.
In enacting the CSA, Congress debated whether marijuana should even be
included in Schedule I. The legislative history for the CSA notes that mari-
juana is not narcotic, not addictive, and does not cause violence or crime.
Marijuana was retained in Schedule I only because the U.S. Assistant Secre-
tary of Health and Scientific Affairs recommended this classification “at
least until the completion of certain studies now underway.”
DuVivier, supra note 74, at 279.
87. 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 844 (2012). In 2014, a total of 21,907 people were sentenced
under federal drug guidelines. 3,971 of those offenders were sentenced for offenses
related to marijuana. Sentences Relative to the Guideline Range for Drug Offenders in
Each Drug Type (Option 1: Three Categories), U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, http://
isb.ussc.gov/Login (follow “All Tables and Figures” hyperlink; follow “Sentences Rel-
ative to the Guideline Range for Drug Offenders in Each Drug Type (Option 1: Three
Categories)” hyperlink; then follow “Filter on Years/Circuits/Districts” hyperlink;
then select “2014”; then select “apply”) (last visited Feb. 25, 2016). There is only one
exception to the prohibition of Schedule I drugs. A Schedule I drug may be legally
used in connection with government-approved research projects. See Marvin L. Lon-
gabaugh, Medical Marijuana vs. ADA in the Workplace, NAT’L JURIS UNI., http://
juris.nationalparalegal.edu/(X(1)S(0xn21tchc4wys2tmw0rqlrlf))/MedicalMarijuana
.aspx?AspxAutoDetectCookieSupport=1 (last visited Feb. 20, 2016).
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the purpose of unlawfully manufacturing, storing, distributing, or
using a controlled substance.88
After the passage of the CSA, marijuana became illegal in all fifty
states but state marijuana laws provided the basis for almost all mari-
juana-related arrests in the country—that is, until states began re-
thinking prohibition in 1996.89 Initially motivated by medical
marijuana’s renewed acceptance, states quickly began citing other rea-
sons for legalizing: the racially disparate impact of prohibition; the fi-
nancial cost of enforcement; and the futility of criminalizing a
substance universally available.90 When California became the first
state to legalize the use of marijuana for medical purposes, it became
the model for Alaska, Oregon, and Washington to follow two years
later.91
By the time Barack Obama took office in January of 2009, thirteen
states had legalized access to medical marijuana.92 Today, twenty-
eight states and the District of Columbia have enacted laws to legalize
medical marijuana,93 but only eight states and the country’s capital
have legalized both recreational and medical marijuana.94
B. High Quantities of Marijuana-Related Businesses Under
the Obama Administration
1. Ogden Memo
On October 19, 2009, Deputy Attorney General David Ogden is-
sued a much-publicized memorandum (“Ogden Memo”) intended to
guide United States Attorneys in investigating and prosecuting mari-
88. 21 U.S.C. § 856 (2012) (emphasis added).
89. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Jolene Forman, Allen Hopper & Sam Kamin, Coop-
erative Federalism and Marijuana Regulation, 62 UCLA L. REV. 74, 84 (2015) (“Since
the CSA’s implementation more than forty years ago, nearly all marijuana enforce-
ment in the United States has taken place at the state level. For example, of the nearly
900,000 marijuana arrests in 2012, arrests made at the state and local level dwarfed
those made by federal officials by a ratio of 109 to 1.”).
90. Id. at 84–85.
91. ALASKA STAT. §§ 17.37.010-080 (2013); OR. REV. STAT. § 475.300 (2007);
WASH. REV. CODE § 69.51A (2007); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 329-121-128 (2013); COLO.
CONST. art. XVIII, § 16 (2013).
92. No state had legalized access to recreational marijuana when Barack Obama
took office. See Milestones in U.S. Marijuana Laws, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 26, 2013), http://
www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/10/27/us/marijuana-legalization-timeline.html?_r=
0#/#time283_8152.
93. 28 Legal Medical Marijuana States and DC, PROCON.ORG, http://medicalmari
juana.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=000881 (last updated Nov. 9, 2016,
11:49:11 AM PST).
94. On November 8, 2016, an additional four states voted in favor of recreational
marijuana: California, Nevada, Maine, and Massachusetts all voted in favor of legal-
ized use, sale, and consumption of recreational marijuana. See generally Ben Gilbert,
4 States just Voted to Make Marijuana Completely Legal — Here’s What we Know,
BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 9, 2016), http://www.businessinsider.com/marijuana-states-legal-
ized-weed-2016-11.
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juana-related offenses in light of various state laws permitting the cul-
tivation, sale, and consumption of marijuana for medical purposes.95
The Ogden Memo reaffirmed the illegality of marijuana; however, it
noted that the prosecution of individuals and caregivers in clear and
unambiguous compliance with existing state law was an inefficient use
of limited federal resources.96
States with medical-marijuana provisions saw the Ogden Memo as
an opportunity to set up shop, with marijuana dispensaries outnum-
bering Starbucks in California that year.97 However, a closer look at
the Ogden Memo’s direction reveals that property owners who were
quick to hand over their property to marijuana-related businesses
were either “careless or delusional.”98 The Ogden Memo expressly
states that marijuana-related businesses remain a priority for federal
enforcement, even if the business complies with state laws.
2. Cole Memo
Eight months later, on June 29, 2011, Ogden’s successor Deputy At-
torney General James Cole released a memorandum (“Cole Memo”)
affirming how seriously many had misread the Ogden Memo. Al-
though the Cole Memo conceded that efficient use of limited federal
funding, as articulated in the Ogden Memo, would remain unchanged,
it also warned that the Ogden Memo was never intended to shield
marijuana-related businesses from federal enforcement action “even
where those activities purport to comply with state law. Persons who
are in the business of cultivating, selling, or distributing marijuana,
and those who knowingly facilitate such activities, are in violation of
95. Ogden Memo, supra note 10.
96. Id.
97. See In California, Marijuana Dispensaries Outnumber Starbucks, NPR (Oct.
15, 2009), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=113822156 (“There
are more medical marijuana dispensaries than Starbucks”); W. Zachary Malinowski,
Colorado’s Marijuana Dispensary Boom, Now Undergoing Regulation, Leads to Ex-
plosion of Patients Seeking Licenses, 420MAGAZINE http://www.420magazine.com/fo-
rums/medical-marijuana-news/138451-colorado-s-marijuana-dispensary-boom-leads-
explosion-patients- seeking-licenses.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2016) (noting that after
the Ogden Memo, the number of patients seeking medical marijuana cards skyrock-
eted to over 1000 per week).
98. Sam Kamin & Eli Wald, Marijuana Lawyers: Outlaws or Crusaders?, 91 OR. L.
REV. 869, 882 (2013)
A close reading of the Ogden memo shows that the optimistic interpretation
of those who rushed into the marijuana business in 2009 was either careless
or delusional. Although it was read by many as a pledge not to enforce fed-
eral marijuana laws in those states that have adopted MMJ laws, the Ogden
memo in fact comes closer to doing the opposite: “The prosecution of signifi-
cant traffickers of illegal drugs, including marijuana, and the disruption of
illegal drug manufacturing and trafficking networks continues to be a core
priority in the Department’s efforts against narcotics and dangerous drugs,
and the Department’s investigative and prosecutorial resources should be
directed towards these objectives.”
Id. (quoting Ogden Memo, supra note 10).
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the [CSA], regardless of state law.”99 The Cole Memo goes on to clar-
ify that “[s]tate laws or local ordinances are not a defense to civil . . .
enforcement of federal law with respect to such conduct, including en-
forcement of the CSA.”100
The Cole Memo’s assertions began to find validation in the months
that followed when marijuana-related businesses and their landlords
began receiving cease and desist letters and numerous other mari-
juana-related businesses faced federal grand jury indictments.101
Moreover, the Cole Memo’s promise of civil enforcement was not an
empty one: landlords in violation of the CSA have been, and continue
to be, subject to civil forfeiture.
V. JUST BECAUSE YOU CAN DOES NOT MEAN YOU SHOULD
Landlord-tenant law is an entirely state governed regime where
commercial landlords are unique from their residential counterparts.
The CSA does not purport to prohibit property owners from housing
drug users; however, it unambiguously prohibits property owners
from leasing their property to marijuana-related businesses.102 There-
fore, residential landlords in the handful of states that prohibit prop-
erty owners from discriminating against medical marijuana patients on
their status alone are less likely to face civil forfeiture actions.103 Com-
mercial landlords, alternatively, are not prevented from creating lease
agreements that prohibit the use, sale, and possession of the substance
on their properties. Property owners who fail to consider marijuana
legislation when negotiating lease agreements face dire consequences.
Specifically because once a property owner has leased property to a
marijuana-related business, it becomes difficult to evict the tenant on
the basis of a federal law violation.104 LMTs may successfully argue
that the property owner had knowledge and consented to the mari-
juana-related use, which is legal under state law.105 If successful, the
property owner will be estopped from evicting the marijuana-related
99. Memorandum from Deputy Attorney Gen., James M. Cole on Guidance Re-
garding the Ogden Memo in Jurisdictions Seeking to Authorize Marijuana for Medi-
cal Use (June 29, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/oip/docs/dag-guidance-2011-for-
medical-marijuana-use.pdf (emphasis added).
100. Id.
101. Kamin, supra note 98, at 883 (citing Feds Warn, Indict California Medical Ma-
rijuana Dispensary Operators, KABC-TV (Oct. 7, 2011), http://abclocal.go.com/kabc/
story?section=news/state&id=8383655).
102. 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(1)–(2).
103. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2813(A) (Supp. 2012); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
16, § 4905A(a)(1) (Supp. 2011); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2423-E(2) (Supp.
2011); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 21-28.6-4(c) (West Supp. 2011); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 21a-
408p(b)(2) (West 2016).
104. See Marcus Painter, Rents, Refi’s, and Reefer Madness: How Legal Is Legalized
Marijuana for Landlords and Their Lenders?, 29 PROB. & PROP. 10, 19 (Jan./Feb.
2015).
105. See id.
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business and left incapable to adhering to the demands of the govern-
ment’s cease and desist letter.
A. Innocent Owners of Guilty Property
Throughout most of civil asset forfeiture’s history, the court’s relig-
ious adherence to guilty property fictions meant that the pleas of inno-
cent property owners were ignored.106 In 1974, dicta from a United
States Supreme Court decision hinted at the possibility of a defense
for truly innocent owners based on the Fifth Amendment’s Takings
Clause. A decade later, Congress began amending a series of civil
drug forfeiture laws to include the illusion of an innocent-owner
defense.107
B. Constitutional Defenses
Although the U.S. Supreme Court in Calero-Toledo v. Pearson
Yacht Leasing Co. ultimately held that the Constitution did not pro-
hibit Congress from authorizing the forfeiture of illegally-used prop-
erty from owners who had no involvement with or knowledge of the
alleged offense, it noted in dicta that seizing property belonging to
truly innocent owners gave “rise to serious constitutional
questions.”108
In 1971, Pearson Yacht Leasing Company (“Pearson”) leased a
yacht to Donovan and Lorreta Olsen, two Puerto Rican residents.109
The leasing agreement provided that the yacht would be used only for
“any and all legal purpose.”110 A year later, the couple was arrested
for possessing marijuana on board Pearson’s yacht.111 The amount of
marijuana is unclear, with some speculating it was merely a joint.112
Authorities seized the yacht almost immediately,113 citing the Con-
trolled Substances Act of Puerto Rico, which provided for the forfei-
ture of conveyances used “in any manner to facilitate the
transportation” of marijuana.114 Following the seizure, the lessees de-
106. Guerra, supra note 57, at 364–65.
107. See generally Psychotropic Substances Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-633, sec.
101, § 801a, 92 Stat. 3768, 3768–772; 21 U.S.C.A. 881(a)(6) (West 2002).
108. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 689 (1974).
109. Id. at 665.
110. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht
Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974) (No. 73-157), 1974 WL 185609, at *3.
111. See Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 665.
112. See Christine Meyer, Zero Tolerance for Forfeiture: A Call for Reform of Civil
Forfeiture Law, 5 Notre Dame J.L., Ethics & Pub. Pol’y 853, 862 (1991).
113. The lessees in Calero-Toledo were arrested in early May 1971, after a year and
two months in exclusive possession of the yacht. Id. at 665-68. Authorities seized the
yacht on July 11, 1972, without prior notice to Pearson Yacht Leasing Company or the
two lessees. Id.
114. Controlled Substances Act of Puerto Rico, P.R. LAWS ANN., tit. 24, § 2512
(Supp. 1973), similar to the then Federal Act, 21 U.S.C § 801. tit. 24, § 2512 (a)(4) of
the Controlled Substances Act of Puerto Rico, provided for forfeiture of:
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faulted on the yacht’s rental payments and Pearson attempted to re-
cover possession; in doing so, Pearson became aware of the seizure
and immediately filed suit seeking permanent injunctive relief on two
grounds.115 First, Pearson claimed the lack of notice preceding the
seizure violated his Fifth Amendment Due Process rights.116 Second,
Pearson alleged its property was seized for public use without just
compensation and thus in violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings
Clause.117
On Pearson’s due process claims, the government argued that a
“seizure” did not become a “forfeiture” until after the case was tried;
without a “forfeiture,” the government was not “depriving” Pear-
son.118 Pearson, on the other hand, argued that the forfeiture statute
did not meet due process requirements because it called for “the
seizure of property without a hearing and before judgment;” did not
provide “an adequate and meaningful hearing;” presumed illegal use;
placed the burden of proof on the claimant; and provided limited de-
fenses.119 Agreeing with Pearson, the district court found the forfei-
ture statute to be unconstitutional on its face because it failed to
include a provision whereby the seizure could be contested before be-
ing executed.120
The district court also agreed that Pearson’s property had been
taken for public use without just compensation. Relying on a recent
U.S. Supreme Court opinion and several federal court opinions prior
to it, the district court rejected the legal fiction that civil forfeiture
depends upon, noting that the “imposition of forfeiture on the [prop-
erty owner] is penal and causes an unconstitutional deprivation of per-
sonal property ‘without just compensation.’”121
The Supreme Court, however, reversed, explaining that the forfei-
ture survived constitutional challenge because of its underlying public
policy rationale—that forfeiture prevents property from being used to
perpetuate unlawful activities.122 With this latent justification exposed,
(4) all conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles, mount or vessels, which are
used, or are intended for use, to transport, or in any manner to facilitate the
transportation, sale, receipt, possession, or concealment of [a controlled sub-
stance] described in clauses (1) or (2) [of this subsection].
115. See Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., Div. of Grumman Allied Indus., Inc. v. Massa,
363 F. Supp. 1337, 1340 (D.P.R. 1973).
116. See id.
117. See id.
118. Appellee’s Brief, Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663
(1974) (No. 73-157), 1973 WL 172407, at *2.
119. Pearson Yacht, 363 F. Supp. 1337 at 1342 (citing Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67
(1972)).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1341 (quoting McKeehan v. United States, 438 F.2d 739, 745 (1971)).
122. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 686–89; see
generally H. R. REP. NO. 76-1054, at 2–3 (1939); S. REP. NO. 76-926, at 2 (1939):
The present legislation is necessary because there are no laws which subject
to forfeiture vessels, vehicles, and aircraft employed to facilitate violations of
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the Court stated that if an owner proved “that he was uninvolved in
and unaware of the wrongful activity,” and “that he had done all that
reasonably could be expected to prevent the proscribed use of his
property, . . . it would be difficult to conclude that forfeiture served
legitimate purposes and was not unduly oppressive.”123
Yet in dicta, Justice William O. Douglas’s dissent created a narrow
exception for property owners who could demonstrate a higher degree
of innocence. Justice Douglas suggested that innocent property own-
ers could potentially avoid forfeiture of their property by showing that
the illegal act had been done “without . . . privity or consent,” such
that the property owner was “uninvolved in and unaware of the
wrongful activity,” and “had done all that reasonably could be ex-
pected to prevent the proscribed use of his property.”124
Currently, federal courts are divided as to whether Calero-Toledo
means that property owners claiming a lack of consent must prove
they did all that reasonably could be expected to prevent the pro-
scribed use of their property. Specifically, the Second, Fourth, and
Eleventh Circuits expressly incorporate the Calero-Toledo standard
into the statutory definition of consent while the First, Sixth, and
Eighth Circuits expressly reject the absorption of the Calero-Toledo
standard. In Washington D.C. and the four states that have legalized
all forms of marijuana, the federal appellate courts either do not ad-
dress the constitutional defense proposed by Calero-Toledo or leave
its application to the district courts.125
Despite well-founded and persistent concerns over the summary na-
ture of section 881(a)(7) proceedings, courts have been reluctant to
extend property owners any constitutional protections. In fact, courts
across the country have uniformly held that the Eighth Amendment
prohibitions against cruel, unusual, or disproportionate punishment
does not apply to section 881(a)(7) forfeitures because the statute is
civil, not criminal, in nature.126 The United States Supreme Court it-
self has repeatedly affirmed that civil forfeiture does not violate a
the counterfeiting laws or the National Firearms Act. and because tile statu-
tory provisions for forfeiting vessels, vehicles, and aircraft used to facilitate
violations of the narcotic laws are entirely inadequate. It is made doubly
necessary, because not infrequently the means of transportation employed in
violations of the laws involved in the present bill are peculiarly adapted to
such type of work as, for instance, high-speed powerboats, fast cars with se-
cret compartments, and aircraft. If such means of transportation are not for-
feited, they will be readily available for future violations.
123. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 689–90.
124. Id. at 689.
125. See Anthony J. Franze, Casualties of War?: Drugs, Civil Forfeiture, and the
Plight of the “Innocent Owner”, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 369, 394 (1994).
126. Seizure or forfeiture of real property used to illegally possess, manufacture,
process, purchase, or sell controlled substances under § 511(a)(7) of Comprehensive
Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 (21 U.S.C.A. § 881(a)(7)), 104
A.L.R. 288 (1991).
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property owner’s rights under the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment or the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.127
Similarly, courts have rejected the notion that civil forfeiture proceed-
ings have the potential to amount to double jeopardy where the prop-
erty owner also faces a criminal prosecution.128
C. Innocent-Owner Defense
The most common non-constitutional defense is the “innocent-
owner” defense provided for in Section 881(a)(7). A majority of juris-
dictions have held that the property owner’s mental state must
demonstrate a lack of knowledge of or lack of consent to the use or
intended use of the property in question for illegal narcotics activ-
ity.129 The Comprehensive Act’s innocent-owner defense clearly ex-
cludes real property that was unlawfully in the possession of another
from forfeiture; however, the exception does not clearly cover real
property lawfully in the possession of another as a tenant or lessee.
The innocent-owner defense to forfeiture is contained in section
881(a)(6) and states in pertinent part:
(a) The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the United States
and no property right shall exist in them:
. . .
127. See Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442 (1996). In a 5-4 decision, the Court up-
held the forfeiture of a car jointly owned by a married couple and seized by the state
upon a finding that the husband had used it for purposes of soliciting sexual activity
with a prostitute. Id. The wife claimed that her lack of knowledge or consent of the
unlawful activity rendered her “innocent,” and therefore the forfeiture violated her
rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 449–50. For a more in-depth look at the Due
Process portion of the Bennis opinion, see George M. Dery III, Adding Injury to In-
sult: The Supreme Court’s Extension of Civil Forfeiture to its Illogical Extreme in Ben-
nis v. Michigan, 48 S.C. L. REV. 359 (1997) (focusing on the Due Process portion of
the Bennis Court’s opinion).
128. See generally United States v. 18755 N. Bay Rd., 13 F.3d 1493, 1499 (11th Cir.
1994) (finding the civil forfeiture of a home used for an illegal gambling operation was
not barred by double jeopardy, even though the defendant had previously been pun-
ished by a criminal conviction for the same gambling offense); United States v. Mil-
lan, 2 F.3d 17, 20 (2d Cir. 1993) (finding that double jeopardy was not implicated
because the criminal and civil forfeiture actions were part of a single proceeding, de-
spite the fact that the actions were filed separately with their own docket numbers),
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 922 (1994); United States v. Nakamoto, 876 F. Supp. 235,
238–39 (D. Haw. 1995) (finding no double jeopardy where the property owner volun-
tarily chose not to contest the civil forfeiture and was not a party to that proceeding),
aff’d, 67 F.3d 310 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Walsh, 873 F. Supp. 334, 337 (D.
Ariz. 1994) (finding that the defendant waived his right to assert double jeopardy
because he elected not to be a party to the civil forfeiture proceeding); Crowder v.
United States, 874 F. Supp. 700, 703 (N.C. 1994) (finding that double jeopardy was
not implicated when the defendant was convicted of conspiracy, while the property
was forfeited for its connection to the underlying substantive crime).
129. See Franze, supra note 125 at 394.
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(6) All moneys, negotiable instruments, securities, or other things
of value furnished or intended to be furnished by any person in ex-
change for a controlled substance in violation of [21 U.S.C. 801-904]
. . . except that no property shall be forfeited under this paragraph,
to the extent of the interest of the owner, by reason of any act or
omission established by that owner to have been committed or
omitted without the knowledge or consent of that owner.130
Parsed with the negatives, the statutory language is not only unclear
in its application to marijuana-related tenants, but courts have gone so
far as to call its draftsmanship “impenetrable.”131 Nevertheless, the
innocent-owner defense provided for in section 881(a)(6) has gener-
ally been interpreted to mean that an innocent property owner can
satisfy the defense by showing either a lack of knowledge or a lack of
consent. The issue then, is how the jurisdiction in which the property
sits will interpret “without . . . the knowledge or consent of the
owner,” terms not defined by the statute.132
The most widely accepted definition of knowledge requires aware-
ness, holding that a person acts knowingly when he or she is aware
that it is practically certain that his or her conduct will cause a certain
result.133 Similarly, consent requires “compliance or approval . . . of
what is done or proposed by another.”134 Naturally then, in order to
consent, one must have knowledge of it. Both elements are easy to
demonstrate in proceedings against property owners leasing to LMTs
because state licensure requirements to operate marijuana-related
businesses require both the knowledge and consent of the property
owner.135 Although the statutory innocent-owner defense came about
as Congress expanded the reach of civil forfeiture law to real prop-
erty, it did not create a defense outside those already provided in
Calero-Toledo.
130. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6).
131. See generally United States v. Goodman ex rel. One 1973 Rolls Royce, 43 F.3d
794, 814 (3d Cir. 1994) (applying the rule of lenity after concluding that there is an
ambiguity in the statutory language of § 881(a)(4)).
132. 21 U.S.C.A. § 881(a)(7).
133. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(b)(ii) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). This is
the most widely accepted definition of knowingly. See also LaFave & Scott, Substan-
tive Criminal Law § 3.5(b), at 218 (2d ed. 1986).
134. Consent, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, 2016, http://www.mer
riam-webster.com/dictionary/consent.
135. In United States v. 141st St. Corp., the court held that once a property owner
learns of the illegal activity, he, or she must prove they did all that reasonably could
be expected to prevent the illegal activity. 911 F.2d 870, 878 (2d Cir. 1990). Most
states regulating the possession, sale, and cultivation of marijuana require the prop-
erty owner sign off on the marijuana-related business; therefore, property owners
leasing to LMTs gain actual awareness of the federally illegal activity before the ten-
ant occupies the premises.
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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
The CSA, like the laws of many states, bases prohibition on the
assumption that property owners have a duty to keep their property
safe; however, landlords typically have little control over the property
or retail space once it is leased. Furthermore, standard commercial
lease agreements do not adequately protect property owners involved
with marijuana-related businesses. Accordingly, property owners bold
enough to lease property to marijuana-related businesses must care-
fully modify existing lease provisions, and in some cases, wholly create
new lease provisions to insulate or minimize risks posed by the inter-
play between state and federal regimes. Boilerplate provisions within
standard commercial leases address important legal underpinnings;
however, standard lease agreements have failed to keep pace with the
boom in lawfully operating marijuana businesses. Improperly or
vaguely drafted lease provisions can have significant legal conse-
quences that render the property vulnerable to civil forfeiture.136 The
following suggest lease modifications property owners and respective
counsel should consider before leasing real property to LMTs.
A. Compliance with Law Provision
A property owner’s first benchmark will be determining whether
the property is eligible to be leased to a marijuana-related business.
Commercial leases almost always contain a use of premise and com-
pliance with law provision that will, in some language, require the ten-
ant to use the premises and operate its business in a manner that
complies with “federal, state, county, municipal and other governmen-
tal statutes, laws, rules, orders and regulations affecting tenant’s use of
the premises.”137 However, boilerplate clauses and blanket require-
ments demanding compliance and making any illegal activity by the
tenant a default may not be effective to shield landlords from liability,
particularly when compliance with all federal law is impossible.138 Ac-
cordingly, compliance with law provisions must be modified to require
not only compliance with all applicable federal laws—to the extent
they are not inconsistent with the LMT’s right to use the premises to
operate a marijuana-related business—but also all applicable state
and local laws as well as state and local marijuana regulations.
Specifically, lease agreements must be sure to account for the power
of cities, towns, municipalities, and counties to regulate, restrict, and
proscribe the possession, cultivation, and sale of marijuana among its
borders. For instance, Seattle recently voted to require marijuana-re-
136. See Jerald M. Goodman et al., Ten Lease Provisions That Get No Respect, 28
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lated businesses to obtain and maintain licensing from both its state
regulatory system (the Washington State Liquor and Cannabis
Board), as well as the newly created Seattle Marijuana Regulatory
Business License department.139 Marijuana businesses that do not ap-
ply for local licensing by July 2016 must cease operations; those that
refuse will be assessed civil penalties by Seattle’s Department of Fi-
nance and Administrative Services before criminal charges are consid-
ered.140 Similarly, and despite popular belief, cities and counties
across Colorado have passed bans on marijuana retailers or have
delayed their decisions and placed a hold on the law. In fact, most
areas of Colorado are not allowing recreational cultivation or sales,
despite the state’s active and leading regulatory system.141 Property
owners in states regulating marijuana must amend their lease agree-
ments in accordance to current and upcoming legislation in their state,
county, and city. Property owners must also remain cognizant that a
LMT in one county may be an unlawful one in another.
B. Permitted Use Provision
Although commercial property owners typically require the lease
agreement to list the activities a tenant can conduct on the premises,
many property owners have been hesitant to discuss marijuana-re-
lated operations in their lease agreements. Because all states with reg-
ulatory systems in place require specific licensing, addressing
permitted uses with specificity is key to identifying when a tenant has
violated the contract’s terms. Accordingly, landlords seeking to lease
commercial property to LMTs should consider modifying their per-
mitted use provision to specifically identify whether the tenant will be
139. For the respective laws concerning licensing, see SEATTLE, WASH MUN. CODE
ch. 6.500 (2015), https://www.municode.com/library/wa/seattle/codes/municipal_code?
nodeId=TIT6BURE_SUBTITLE_IVNELICO_CH6.500MABU_6.500.030LIRE#.
Sponsored by Nick Licata, a retired member of the Seattle City Council and passed by
Seattle City Council and Mayor Murray, An Ordinance Related to the Regulation of
Marijuana Businesses went into effect on August 17, 2015. See generally Mayor’s Of-
fice Releases Draft of Proposed Medical Cannabis Ordinance, BALLARD NEWS-TRIB-
UNE (Nov. 26, 2014) http://www.ballardnewstribune.com/2014/11/26/news/mayors-
office-releases-draft-proposed-medical-can. The ordinance requires marijuana-related
businesses operating in Seattle, and those that come into Seattle to engage in mari-
juana-related business, to obtain and maintain a license with the Washington State
Liquor and Cannabis Board (WSLCB) as well as a Seattle Marijuana Regulatory Bus-
iness License and a Seattle Business License Tax Certificate. Id.
140. CITY OF SEATTLE, DEP’T OF FIN. & ADMIN. SERVS., SEATTLE MARIJUANA
REGULATORY BUSINESS LICENSING INFORMATION, http://www.seattle.gov/Docu-
ments/Departments/FAS/RegulatoryServices/MJ-Business-License-Tip-5501.pdf (last
updated Feb. 24, 2016).
141. See John Aguilar & Jon Murray, Colorado Cities and Towns Take Diverging
Paths on Recreational Pot, DENVER POST, http://www.denverpost.com/2014/12/19/col-
orado-cities-and-towns-take-diverging-paths-on-recreational-pot-2/ (last updated Oct.
2, 2016, 3:53 PM) (noting that only 23 of Colorado’s 64 counties have opted to allow
retail marijuana sales).
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWR\3-2\TWR207.txt unknown Seq: 26  3-JAN-17 14:35
116 TEXAS A&M J. OF PROP. L. [Vol. 3
cultivating, processing, transporting, or selling recreational or medici-
nal marijuana. In the case of sales, leases should specify whether the
marijuana will be sold in bud form, leaf form, as plants or plant parts,
resin, or edibles.142 When the tenant intends to use the property to
cultivate marijuana, the permitted use provision should specify the
maximum amount of plants permitted by the cultivator’s license. In all
cases, the license under which the marijuana-related business is oper-
ating, as well as its terms and obligations, should be included in the
lease agreement because all state, county, and city regulations require
compliance with its respective regulations. Property owners must be
aware that LMTs will be subject to random inspections of leased
premises by state, county, or city officials. Violations related to a
leaseholder’s license to operate may result in civil penalties, license
suspension, license revocation, or criminal charges143—all of which
heighten the property’s vulnerability to civil asset forfeiture.
C. Right to Inspect Provision
In tune with assuring that compliance with law and permitted use
provisions are being actively complied with, a property owner must
protect its general right to enter and inspect the premises for compli-
ance; however, state regulations heavily limit access to the leased
property. Specifically, all regulatory systems in place emphasize secur-
ity in the marijuana industry and most state laws require marijuana
establishments limit access to storage, sales, and other sensitive ar-
eas.144 Accordingly, boilerplate inspection clauses must be modified to
balance the landlord’s right to inspect the property with the tenant’s
142. See Michael N. Widener, Medical Cannabis Entrepreneurs as Commercial Te-
nants: Assessment and Treatment, 46 REAL PROP., TR. & EST. L. J. 38 (2011).
143. See SEATTLE, WASH MUN. CODE ch. 6.500 (2015), https://www.municode.com/
library/wa/seattle/codes/municipal_code?nodeId=TIT6BURE_SUBTITLE_IVNELI
CO_CH6.500MABU_6.500.030LIRE#; see also CITY OF GRESHAM ORE., Marijuana
Businesses: Rules & Regulations, https://greshamoregon.gov/Marijuana-Businesses/
(last visited Nov. 13, 2016) (including “random inspections at any time during busi-
ness hours” as a condition to obtaining a marijuana business license); DJ Summers,
Anchorage Regs Would Levy Fines, Ban Pot Clubs, JUNEAUEMPIRE.COM (Jan. 19,
2016, 12:03 AM), http://juneauempire.com/state/2016-01-19/anchorage-regs-would-
levy-fines-ban-pot-clubs (describing an ordinance that would allow city officials to in-
spect and levy fines for marijuana business violators); COLO. DEP’T OF REVENUE,
MARIJUANA ENFORCEMENT DIVISION – STATEMENT OF UNDERSTANDING 1 (Aug. 15,
2015), https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/sites/default/files/Medical%20Business%20
Renewal%20Statement%20of%20Understanding.pdf (requiring that “licensed prem-
ises, including any places of storage where medical marijuana and/or retail marijuana
and/or infused products are stored, sold, dispensed or tested shall be subject to inspec-
tion by the state or local jurisdictions and their investigators, during all business hours
and other times of apparent activity”).
144. “Nearly every state has security requirements for dispensaries and cultivation
sites. Particularly thoughtful are Oregon’s detailed requirements, including security
cameras, commercial grade locks, panic buttons, and tall fences. In Connecticut, the
state can even require a supervised watchman if a dispensary raises certain security
concerns.” See generally Tyler Cole, All State Marijuana Laws Are Not Created Equal,
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right to operate a state sanctioned business. Property owners should
inspect the property regularly to confirm the absence of issues that
may implicate violations of marijuana provisions. By remaining in-
formed of the status of the LMT’s operations, a property owner will
be prepared to exercise its remedies without delay.
D. Indemnification Clause
As it is, commercial leases typically require the tenant to indemnify
the property owner for claims, liabilities, and damages that arise out
of a tenant’s operation of a business in the leased space;145 however,
standard indemnification clauses are not enough to protect property
owners from the special risk incurred by leasing to marijuana-related
businesses. In addition to standard indemnity language covering dam-
age to the property, leases involving marijuana-related operations
must list instances that will necessitate indemnification. For instance,
LMTs must be prepared to indemnify property owners for damage to
the leased premises resulting from break-ins or rent interruption from
forced closure. More importantly, lease agreements must be drafted to
provide compensation to property owners in the event of civil forfei-
ture; however, despite a growing number of insurance companies serv-
ing lawfully operating marijuana businesses,146 none of them offer
insurance in the event of civil forfeiture.147 Nevertheless, a select few
marijuana-related insurance companies do offer coverage against fed-
eral raid operations, purportedly protecting legally operating medical
marijuana businesses against the economic impact of a raid by state or
local law enforcement agencies.148 Though federal prohibition makes
THIRD WAY (Feb. 17, 2016), http://www.thirdway.org/report/all-state-marijuana-laws-
are-not-created-equal.
145. See generally Jennifer Cobb, Esq., Negotiating Key Lease Provisions, 9–10, 12,
42 http://www.lawseminars.com/materials/06ACLWA/aclwa%20m%20cobb%2012-05
.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2016) (proposing indemnification clause hold that “[t]enant
shall indemnify and hold harmless Landlord against and from any and all damages,
liabilities, claims and expenses . . . arising from Tenant’s use of the Premises or the
conduct of its business or from any activity, work, or thing done, permitted or suffered
by the Tenant in or about the Premises. . .”).
146. See, e.g., Medical & Recreational Marijuana, HAYES INS. AGENCY, http://www
.hayesbrokers.com/industries/medical-recreational-marijuana/ (last visited Nov. 14,
2016) (offering insurance for various aspects of a medical marijuana dispensary).
147. See generally Marijuana Business & Professional Insurance Providers, MARI-
JUANA BUS. DAILY, https://mjbizdaily.com/industry-directory/insurance-providers/
(last visited Nov. 14, 2016) (listing over two-hundred insurance companies serving
marijuana-related businesses; none of which are known to offer this specific type of
insurance).
148. To qualify for “State Raid Insurance,” the insured must be found not guilty of
all charges; the maximum limit to liability is $5,000 per occurrence and $10,000 aggre-
gate. See Medical Marijuana Insurance, http://www.mmdinsurance.com (last visited
Mar. 6, 2016) (follow link on left side of webpage entitled “State Raid & Legal
Defense”).
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these insurance policies inherently imperfect, they offer property own-
ers opportunities to negotiate with prospective tenants.
E. Early Termination Clause
Property owners also face a number of legal risks unrelated to civil
forfeiture, such as: federal criminal prosecution for conspiracy to sell,
produce, or transport a controlled substance; nuisance claims and
fines for smoke, odors, or loiterers; and even foreclosure. As discussed
in Part III, the threat of civil forfeiture alone is often enough to shut
down marijuana-related operations. However, a problem arises when
the tenant, a business operating lawfully under state law, refuses to
cease its operations. An early termination clause specifically defining
the events that trigger a property owner’s right to terminate a lease
can help minimize the property owner’s risk of finding itself unable to
evict its tenant and heightens the owner’s chance of appeasing federal
threats. Prosecution, or threat of prosecution, by a U.S. attorney
under the CSA or other drug laws must be grounds for termination of
the lease at the election of the landlord. Additionally, property own-
ers may want to entertain providing LMTs with their own early termi-
nation right, should the business become subject to new marijuana
regulations it cannot afford to comply with.
VII. CONCLUSION
The coming years will continue to foster a great deal of uncertainty
for property owners wishing to lease to marijuana-related businesses.
There have been eight presidential administrations since Richard
Nixon established the Drug Enforcement Administration in 1973.
Seven of those administrations aggressively prosecuted marijuana-re-
lated crimes; only the Obama administration took a different ap-
proach and discouraged prosecution—but with just a few short
months left in office—President Obama has repeatedly stated that
marijuana is not on his list of end-of-term priorities.149 Accordingly,
when a new president takes office on January 20, 2017, he or she
would be well within their constitutional rights to opt for an aggressive
stance on marijuana, one that disregards the Ogden and Cole Memos
credited for the massive economic boom seen by the marijuana indus-
try. Should that occur, the effect might be minimal or inexistent for
property owners because the Memos only created a demand for real
property to conduct marijuana related activities on, but it did not truly
restrain prosecution or serve as a defense. Going forward, one thing is
certain: leasing real property to LMTs will remain federally illegal
149. See Devin Dwyer, Marijuana Not High Obama Priority, ABC NEWS (Dec. 14,
2012), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/OTUS/president-obama-marijuana-users-high-
priority-drug-war/story?id=17946783; see also Christopher Ingraham, Obama says ma-
rijuana reform is not on his agenda for 2016, WASHINGTON POST (Jan. 29, 2016).
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when the next president takes office and property owners will con-
tinue to be lured in by lucrative rent streams. Property owners, and
their counsel, need to be hyper-vigilant of the constantly evolving reg-
ulatory schemes applicable to their respective properties and clients.
Although lease agreements can be tricky to negotiate, even in the
most ordinary of circumstances, a careful, detailed lease agreement
coupled with artful negotiation can serve as a property owner’s best
defense of their interests.
